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focused particularly on them. As described, the book has its clear strength in
its redaction-critical approach. There is probably no better introduction available that addresses these issues properly and efficiently. Denomination-based
seminars or readers and students looking for an introduction with a thematic
and theological focus will make a different choice of literature.
Andrews University
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Rice, Richard. The Future of Open Theism: From Antecedents to Opportunities.
Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2020. Softcover. 254 pp. USD
26.00.
In The Future of Open Theism, Richard Rice surveys the history of a contemporary theological movement (in which he is a significant influence) and
makes suggestions for the further development of its central contribution—
that God and the world are “open” for “interchange” and “give-and-take” (1).
Unfortunately, there has been “no smooth transition from the ‘traditional’
view” (4) to this “novel perspective” (2). Instead, there is a stark contrast
reminiscent of the “radical … incommensurability” described in Kuhn’s
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (4).
Using words by Pears, Rice expresses regret about the resistance by many
to open theism: “How is [it] that when a man of God shifts his opinion
it proves the weakness of his views, and when a man of science does so it
demonstrates the value of his method?” (6). In this review, I reflect on what
Rice identifies as a “persistent” reason for resistance: open theism’s “revisionist view of divine foreknowledge” (76). (See also my “Review of Wm. Curtis
Holtzen’s The God who Trusts” in AUSS 58.1 [Spr 2020]: 113–117).
In the first part of his book, Rice describes the history of open theism.
Chapter 1 traces views of foreknowledge by Arminius, Clarke, McCabe,
Lequyer, Olson, and Elseth (11–26). Chapter 2 surveys books (1980 to
2001) by Rice, Pinnock, Saunders, Hasker, Basinger, and Boyd (27–46); and
briefly discusses Bible texts that appear problematic for open theism (46–48).
Chapter 3 records how open theism triggered an intensely “dismaying” and
“disillusioning” “firestorm” of “controversy” and “open hostility” (51). Fortunately, conflicts in the Evangelical Theological Society (52–58) and other
criticisms (59–71) have softened into productive conversation (71–78).
Chapter 4 documents how—in the words of Rhoda—open theism is
now “embraced by a sizable and growing” number of theistic philosophers
and is “recognized as a major player” (79). Issues surveyed by Rice include
foreknowledge (80–89), providence (89–96), and responsible risk (96–100).
Chapter 5 points out how open theists disagree about the nature of the
God-world interactions they affirm (101). For example, there are different
views on evil (103–108), creation (108–110), and kenotic love (110–118).
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While the issue of foreknowledge is not “the most important aspect of
their view of God, no facet of the open view ... has stimulated more discussion” (80). This is because open theists conclude that “if the future is causally
open” (88) to free choices among contingent options (123, 166–169), it must
also be “epistemically open,” and “it cannot be infallibly known” (88). Here, I
suggest, while rightly questioning the biblical accuracy of the traditional view
of foreknowledge, open theism may have more work to do in re-examining
the biblical view. (On the traditional view, see Feinberg’s No one Like Him:
The Doctrine of God [Crossway, 2001], 305).
Concerning the nature of foreknowledge, Rice gives attention to “the
status of propositions that certain events ‘will’ or ‘will not’ happen” (82); but
does not mention Geach’s view on changing truth values for propositions
about “what will happen” (cf. Patrick Todd, “Geacheanism,” pages 222–252 in
Oxford Studies in Philosophy and Religion 3, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig [Oxford
University Press, 2011]). It seems to me that Geach’s view is more compatible with biblical foreknowledge whereby God warns David about what will
happen, and David acts so that it will not happen (1 Sam 23:11–13).
Building on the history of open theism, in the second part of his book,
Rice makes suggestions for further open theist articulations of Christian
doctrines (121). Chapter 6, “Does Open Theism Limit God?”, is in my
opinion the most important chapter in this section, as implied in the following quotation.
Unless we set aside a familiar way of characterizing open theism, it will be
next to impossible to give the perspective it provides adequate attention.
There is a pervasive tendency on the part of both supporters and critics to
refer to open theism as presenting a “limited” view of God.... Any mention
of God as having limited power, or limited foreknowledge, invites just the
sort of objections that have absorbed so much of the discussion.... Accordingly, I believe that open theists should avoid “limit” language altogether
(124).

Rice gives five reasons why “open theists can make their points effectively without ... the notion of limits” (127). First, “the connotations of ‘limit’
language” are “negative,” implying that God is “restricted” and “hampered,”
and that the open view is “inferior” (127). However, “far from limiting” God,
“a dynamic, interactive view” “enhances our picture of God” (124–125).
Second, the “most prevalent description” of open theism may be “the
least accurate: the idea that it limits God’s knowledge” (127) of future free
choices. However, these choices are not real until they occur, so (according to
Rice) there is nothing for God to foreknow. Consequently, while, omniscience
“includes every possible object of knowledge” (129), “the future is open to
God—and therefore not exhaustively foreknowable” (108).
Third, while “limit language ... denotes nothing distinctive” since it
“applies just as well to other views of God” (130), “open theists should avoid
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[it] altogether” (124). Fourth, God’s sharing power “is often expressed as a
self-limitation,” presupposing “a zero-sum distribution of power” (131).
However, a world where creatures have power “involves a greater display
of divine power than one in which God determines everything”; “exerting
power” is less powerful than “empowering others” (132).
Fifth, the “biblical emphasis” on “divine sensitivity” in time (134) and
“the traditional view of foreknowledge” are incompatible because “the latter
... collapses any distinction between anticipation and realization” (135).
Foreknowledge is not “exhaustive” of “every aspect of his response to what
will occur,” since that would mean that “God’s experience already includes
all” and “actual occurrences contribute nothing new” (Ibid).
In response to these points, I encourage open theists to consider that
the biblical perspective may indicate or allow the following. (1) A dynamic
God implies a dynamic foreknowledge; (2) knowledge of possibilities may
be part of foreknowledge; so that (3) causal openness to free choices may not
limit foreknowledge; (4) interactive foreknowledge may be more powerful
than unilateral foreknowledge; and (5) may not preclude experiential knowledge. (See my “Foreknowledge and the Freedom of Salvation,” in Salvation:
Contours of Adventist Soteriology [Andrews University Press, 2018], 33–59).
In chapter 7, Rice argues that God’s triune “interaction” with the world
is “dynamic” (138) and temporal (141–151). He affirms Ogden’s view that
“God’s eternity is not sheer timelessness, but an infinite fullness of time” (150).
However, he disagrees with Ogden’s process theist view that “the ultimate
metaphysical fact is God-and-world, not just God” (150). At the same time,
Rice’s choice of words may give the impression of a more rigid application
of Rahner’s rule—that God-and-world is the same as God-without-world
(137)—so that (in the words of LaCugna) “there is no hidden God” (140). In
contrast, hiddenness led the apostle Paul to end his discussion of foreknowledge (Rom 8:29; 11:2) with the exclamation: “Oh, the depth of the riches
both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable ...!” (11:33).
At the same time (in harmony with Rahner’s rule), since God has truly
revealed his foreknowledge, we are responsible to understand it as best we can
(cf. Fred Sanders, The Image of the Immanent Trinity: Rahner’s Rule and the
Theological Interpretation of Scripture [Peter Lang, 2005]).
In chapter 8, Rice highlights our libertarian freedom to do otherwise
than we choose to do while acknowledging that our freedom is limited by
sin (123, 166–169). This libertarian freedom is what requires a “revisionary
concept of divine foreknowledge” (172). Like Rice, I reject the traditional
static view of foreknowledge. Besides, I suggest that the Bible indicates or
allows that exhaustive foreknowledge is dynamically refocused as free choices
are actualized. (See my “Foreknowledge and the Freedom of Salvation,” 33).
In chapter 9, Rice discusses salvation in Christ, who is the definitive
revelation of God’s love (123), so that “the forces of evil were decisively
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defeated” (174). Christ was truly tempted; his victory was not “a foregone
conclusion” (124), “assured in advance” (181), but “a genuine achievement” (181). Yet, “the chances of Christ’s failure” “were minimal, perhaps
minuscule,” compared with “the tremendous benefits ... they made possible”
(182). At the same time, Rice seems to imply that Christ’s victory was not
foreknown from the beginning because it was not certain and definite (or
settled) in advance (181–182).
Here Rice may be responding to the traditional view of God’s free
knowledge of free choices (which is certain and definite because it results
from God’s choice of which “world” of free choices he will create). Contrary
to the traditional view (and many open theists), I propose that the biblical
view of God’s foreknowledge does not indicate that the future is already
certain and definite (See again 1 Sam 23:11–13). Instead, God uses his
certain (confident) and definite (detailed) foreknowledge in deliberating
about Creator-creation interactions that are open. (See my “Foreknowledge
and the Freedom of Salvation,” 37, n.13).
In Chapter 10, Rice indicates that the doctrine of the church affirms
“the interconnectedness between individual and community” (212) in “a
new communal consciousness” (195). This “eventually, dramatically, and
permanently transformed the prevailing perspective on the human in western
civilization” (199). Nevertheless, the transformation is incomplete since the
problem of individualism continues (204–213). Rice’s valuable emphasis on
interconnectedness triggers in my mind reflections on God’s foreknowledge
of all possible relations of humans with the entire creation and with God.
In Chapter 11, Rice proposes that God has a plan beyond death, not
for a timeless moment, but for “ongoing ... experiences” (221). This is not a
risk-free plan, but a “higher” providence (229) guided by the knowledge that
“the likelihood is practically remote” that no one would sin or that no one
would be saved (231). Rice mentions that, according to Boyd, God “sees all
possibilities ... and eliminates those in which his ultimate purposes are not
fulfilled” (232). God also “knows all ... variables” for how human choices
cause “an ever-closing window of opportunity” since we are “becoming the
decisions we make” (Ibid) as “libertarian freedom dissolves into freedom
of spontaneity” (233). Again, it seems to me that biblical foreknowledge
includes all the variables that are considered in God’s dynamic plan.
In conclusion, I enthusiastically recommend The Future of Open
Theism as an essential introduction to the past, present, and future of this
fascinating theological movement. Rice states that “the God who moves,
risks, and trusts is our companion through all of life’s experiences, fully
aware of and deeply affected by all that we undergo, providing us constant
encouragement and help. This ... is the enduring appeal of the openness of
God” (237). I too have sensed the allure of open theism, though I affirm
that God’s foreknowledge of free choices is exhaustive (comprehensive),
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certain (confident), definite (detailed), and dynamic (interactive). Further
study is needed to explore whether this view of biblical foreknowledge is
a helpful response to the suggestion by Rice that open theists should avoid
using limit-language to refer to God.
Andrews University

Martin F. Hanna

Rubenstein, Jay. Nebuchadnezzar’s Dream: The Crusades, Apocalyptic Prophecy,
and the End of History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. xxi + 280
pp, 16 color plates, 3 maps, and 10 tables. USD 31.95.
Jay Rubenstein is a professor of history at the University of Southern California and a prolific historian specializing in the High Middle Ages, the crusades,
and biblical exegesis. He previously published two works covering roughly the
same period: Armies of Heaven: The First Crusade and the Quest for Apocalypse
(Basic Books, 2011) and The First Crusade: A Brief History with Documents
(Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2015). The present tome, however, as the culmination
of fifteen years of research and reflection, is narrower in scope, but far denser.
What lies at the end of Rubenstein’s long pilgrimage––escorted by
fabled warriors, jongleurs, artists, and monks––is a remarkable tale of
court intrigue, political monkeyshines, and ecclesiastical politics. The book
begins with sixteen color plates showcasing medieval religious art, opening a
window into the apocalypse as seen through the eyes of medieval Christians.
The collection was carefully curated from the Apocalypse cycle contained
in the still extant autograph of the Liber Floridus (1120 CE, lit. “Book of
Flowers”)––a general encyclopedia written by Lambert, canon of SaintOmer (ca. 1061–1150), as well as drawings by Otto of Freising, Hildegard
of Bingen, and Joachim of Fiore.
The book is divided into four parts comprising twelve chapters, and
covering sequential historical periods. Each period highlights specific players
and how they interact, overlap, or overshadow each other. Rubenstein begins
with the admission that his original premise that “the Apocalypse and the
crusades had nothing to do with one another” (xvii), did not hold water in
light of the complex web of apocalyptical eschatology that dominated the
eleventh and twelve centuries. To this end, he surveys the “building blocks of
the apocalypse” as present in the Tyconian-Augustinian tradition of biblical
interpretation influential at the time (ch 3). The book then zeroes in on the
apocalyptic “illusion” that sparked the First Crusade and the “disillusionment” that followed it. This task dominates Part 1.
One of Rubenstein’s greatest achievements is to demonstrate how
medieval exegetes such as Guibert of Nogent (ca. 1060–1125) reshaped the
biblical text to make it fit contemporary perceptions of how the apocalypse
would unfold. Beginning with the first apocalyptic text, the book of Daniel

